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ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS, AND JEL CODES
Performing a panel data analysis for the EU countries, for the period between 1995
and 2019, this work studies the individual conduction of monetary and fiscal policies,
so as the interactions among them. We aim to understand the differences that exist be-
tween the euro area and the non-euro area countries and how the financial crisis affects
them. Results show that inflation is crucial for the determination of interest rates and
fiscal authorities are concerned with the health of public finances. Concerning the inter-
actions between these two policies, there is evidence that it is a relation of substitutability,
however with no response of monetary authorities to fiscal policy. The financial crisis
impacted negatively both the short-term nominal interest rates and the cyclically adjusted
primary balance, however with a higher degree in the euro area.
KEYWORDS: Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy; Interactions; Reaction Functions; Great
Recession.
JEL CODES: E52; E62; E63; E65; H62.
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RESUMO, PALAVRAS-CHAVE, E CÓDIGOS JEL
Através da utilização de dados de painel para os países da UE, para o período com-
preendido entre 1995 e 2019, este trabalho pretende estudar a condução de política mon-
etária, política fiscal e as interações entre as mesmas. O nosso objetivo passa por entender
as diferenças que existem entre a zona do euro e os países que não pertencem à mesma, as-
sim como o efeito da crise financeira sobre as mesmas. Os resultados alcançados mostram
que a inflação é crucial para a determinação das taxas de juro e que as autoridades fiscais
apresentam preocupação no que toca à saúde das finanças públicas. No que toca às inter-
ações entre estas duas políticas, há evidência de que a relação existente é de substituição,
no entanto sem resposta da autoridade monetária à política fiscal. A crise financeira ap-
resenta um impacto negativo sobre a taxas de juro nominais de curto prazo, assim como
sobre o défice primário ajustado ao ciclo, no entanto com uma maior intensidade na zona
euro.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Política Monetária; Política Fiscal; Interações; Funções de Reação;
Grande Recessão.
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INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
By Alexandre Sousa
Abstract: Performing a panel data analysis for the EU countries, for the period
between 1995 and 2019, this work studies the individual conduction of mone-
tary and fiscal policies, so as the interactions among them. Results show that
inflation is crucial for the determination of interest rates and fiscal authorities
are concerned with the health of public finances. There is evidence that there is
a relation of substitutability between monetary and fiscal policies. The finan-
cial crisis impacted negatively both the short-term nominal interest rates and
the cyclically adjusted primary balance.
1 INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy relates to all the actions and measures that central banks devise and
implement in their aim to fulfil their mandate and mission of price stability. In their pursuit
to achieve their goal, central banks rely on open market operations, reserve requirements
and discount rates. By contrast, fiscal policy is conceived and executed by governments
via changes in the composition of a country’s public finance, i.e. government expenditure
and revenues, with the objective of influencing macroeconomic conditions and economic
activity.
Over time, the historical effectiveness of monetary policy as a means to overcome
crises or boost activity in the financial sector (hence transmitting its effects to the real
economy) relegated fiscal policy to a second place. Monetary policy does not have an
implementation lag as big as that of fiscal policy, influencing economic conditions quickly
and effectively.
However, it would be amiss to dissociate the study of these two policies: the success
of monetary policy depends on fiscal sustainability and the value of a government’s assets
and liabilities is influenced by the price level. For that reason, studying the effects that
each of these policies have on one another becomes of high importance, in order to un-
derstand how each of the authorities (monetary and fiscal) affects the economy separately
and jointly.
The economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009 put a spotlight on the interactions
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between monetary and fiscal policies. In their attempts to counter the effects of the cri-
sis, central banks around the world eased monetary conditions, lowering interest rates,
and supplying abundant liquidity to the banking sector. The constraints imposed by the
zero lower bound led central banks to the implementation of so-called unconventional
monetary policy. Despite all the efforts, these measures did not yield sufficient results,
and governments were required to step in and play a more significant role. Expansionary
packages were adopted in several countries, with the intention of avoiding even bigger
macroeconomic consequences and helping economic activity to recover. These decisions
led governments to face historically high deficits and debt levels in the aftermath of the
crisis.
The European Union (EU) becomes an interesting case of study when it comes to the
effects of the policy mix: the twenty-eight Member States represent a highly heteroge-
neous pool due to their levels of indebtedness, growth and inflation rates, among others.
In addition, we can identify two sub-groups: one whose members are those countries
that adopted the euro as their currency (euro-area countries), and another one for those
countries which decided to maintain their national currency (non-euro area countries).
In non-euro area countries, the corresponding national central bank operates as ultimate
monetary authority, implementing their policy based on national objectives. Fiscal policy
is also the national government’s prerogative. In the case of the euro area, the European
Central Bank (ECB) is the authority in the design and implementation of monetary policy
(being part of the Eurosystem), while each country is responsible for its fiscal decisions.
This leads to a situation where, in the countries that use the euro as their currency, there is
a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. Studying how this common policy interacts with the
country-specific fiscal policies is of great interest.
In this study, we use an empirical approach to analyse monetary and fiscal policies
in the EU. For that, we perform a panel data analysis with data from the twenty-eight
countries that belong to the Union. As mentioned above, Member States can be naturally
divided in euro area and non-euro area countries, depending on whether they use the euro
as their currency or not — we study the divergence in the formulation of monetary and
fiscal policies between these two groups. Our data covers the period between 1995 and
2
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2019. With our analysis, we aim at unveiling potential differences in the way monetary
and fiscal policies were conducted prior and after the 2007-2009 crisis.
Our results suggest that monetary policy is strongly influenced by the inflation rate,
while not taking into consideration the cyclically adjusted primary balance. On the other
hand, fiscal authorities seem to be concerned with the public finances, since the cyclically
adjusted primary balance reacts positively to the debt level. Moreover, there is evidence
that the relation between monetary and fiscal policies is of substitutability, as the monetary
authority seems to be dominant when the cyclically adjusted primary balance is not under
control. Concerning the post-crisis period, it is characterised by lower interest rates and
lower cyclically adjusted primary balances, being the euro-area more affected than the
rest of the EU countries.
This paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents relevant theoretical and empir-
ical studies related to the topic. Chapter 3 describes the data used in this study and the
adopted econometric approach. Chapter 4 provides an empirical assessment to monetary
policy, fiscal policy and the policy mix, including the functions used and the discussion
of the results. Chapter 5 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical Background
For a long part of economic history, there was the belief that inflation was solely a
monetary phenomenon. This convention was derived from the quantity theory of money,
according to which price stability is achieved through the commitment of the central bank.
Through the intertemporal government budget constraint, we can understand this theory.









where Bt is the outstanding government debt in period t, Pt is the price level in period
t, st is the primary budged balance at period t and r is the real interest rate. Taking
into consideration Equation (1), the monetarist doctrine defends that the constraint should
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restrict the expenditure and revenue policies implemented by the government. This said,
those policies must be adjusted, so that for any Pt, Equation (1) holds. Hence, when
the relation is not in equilibrium, the government is the one that must adjust its policies,
through revenues or expenses, in order to restore the equality. Authors such as Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) perpetuated this theory.
However, toward the end of the twentieth century, the belief that both monetary and
fiscal policies play an important role in the determination of the price level increased.
Sargent and Wallace (1981) were the first authors to explore the idea of a policy mix,
concluding that, in a situation where the fiscal authority establishes its policies without
taking into consideration the decisions made by the central bank, the monetary authority
may be forced to accept a price level higher than desired.
After Sargent and Wallace’s work, some other authors (Leeper (1991), Sims (1994),
Woodford (1995)) went even further and defended a less orthodox view, which was en-
capsulated in the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), that contradicted
the quantity theory of money. According to this theory, Equation (1) does not constrain
the government policy making, since there is nothing obliging it to do so. Instead, when
the equality in (1) is disturbed, the consequence is a change in the price P , so that the
equilibrium is restored.
According to Leeper (1991), monetary and fiscal policies may have active or passive
roles. An active authority exists when policy makers do not consider the debt level, while
a passive one is constrained by the shocks on the debt level. This said, the author presented
two scenarios: one in which there is an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy
(and hence the debt shocks are being taken into consideration in the government decision
making); and a second one, where the shocks in the debt level affect money creation,
meaning that the monetary policy has a passive role, while fiscal policy is not constrained
by the debt evolution, presenting an active behaviour.
Sims (1994) defended that monetary policy, by itself, is not sufficient to determine
the equilibrium price level, since fiscal policy also plays an important role. The author
stated that the value of fiat money depends on how the public sees the soundness of fiscal
policy. This said, the decision making of the government has a direct effect over the price
4
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level, which depends on the perception that agents have over the fiscal policies being
implemented.
In turn, Woodford (1995) criticised the quantity theory of money arguing that this
view is incomplete, since it does not consider the effect of fiscal policy over the price
level. Contrarily, the price level is relevant in the government decision making because
it changes the real value of net government liabilities. Hence, Woodford established two
policy regimes regarding the determination of the price level: the Ricardian and the non-
Ricardian regimes. On the one hand, in the Ricardian one, in which the quantity theory
of money stands correct, the government has no effect over the determination of the price
level. Regarding this regime, the author stated, "such regimes represent a highly special
case, for there is no reason why a well-formulated policy rule must force to hold, re-
gardless of the path of the price level." On the other hand, the non-Ricardian regime is
characterised by a government that is not constrained by the evolution of the public debt,
and hence is not following a Ricardian policy. In this situation, the central bank must
adjust its monetary policy, so that the intertemporal budget constraint is met.
The topic of the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies gained renewed im-
portance with the Great Recession. As Blanchard et al. (2010) stated, during the financial
crisis, because of the zero-lower bound, conventional monetary policy became ineffec-
tive and most central banks in developed countries turned into unconventional policies,
that went from quantitative easing to target easing and new forms of liquidity provision.
However, monetary policy was reaching its limits and the need to rely on fiscal policy
rose. Moreover, since the crisis was expected to last, the government decision making
would be beneficial, even with the lags associated with it. Furthermore, Blanchard et al.
(2013) suggested new solutions for the after-crisis. For central banks’ decision making
it is proposed that they should also target financial stability and economic activity, while
performing forward guidance, so that they are able to influence market expectations. In
fact, the authors stated that there is evidence that forward guidance announcements have
an economic impact, and that, while other unconventional monetary policy tools may end
up being unnecessary, forward guidance is here to stay. Regarding fiscal policy, Blanchard
et al. (2013) highlighted the important aspect of the risk of fiscal dominance. This risk is
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caused by the need for difficult fiscal adjustments, leading the government to put pressure
on the central banks to help limiting borrowing costs, hence jeopardising the central bank
independence.
2.2 Empirical Research
The existing literature on the topic being studied, focuses especially on the individ-
ual reaction functions of monetary and fiscal policies. Nevertheless, some authors also
studied the interaction between these policies, besides the single effects.
Regarding the monetary policy reaction function, most of the literature takes interest
rates as the main variable. Taylor (1993) proposed a monetary policy rule in order to con-
trol the inflation rate, which is known as the Taylor rule. According to this rule, central
banks should increase interest rates when inflation is high or when there is a positive out-
put gap. Several central banks around the world used the logic of the Taylor rule and its
effectiveness has been assessed several times. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) showed that,
between 1990 and 1998, for the countries that afterwards adhered to the euro area, the
monetary policy reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993) is a good fit. The authors
state that the ECB could use the Taylor rule to conduct its monetary policy. Gerdesmeier
and Roffia (2003) corroborated these results, but found that adding M3, the broadest mon-
etary aggregate, and the fluctuations of stock prices, the accuracy of the model increases.
Furthermore, Ruth (2007) estimated an interest rate reaction function, for the euro area,
using panel data, finding that the ECB only deviated from the interest rate path when there
was area-wide inflation.
Taking fiscal policy, and its long-run stability, into consideration, studies focus, essen-
tially, on two indicators: the debt stock level and the primary balance flow. To estimate
fiscal policy feedback rules in the United States of America (USA), Favero and Monacelli
(2003) estimated Markov-switching regression methods, for the period between 1960 and
2002. The authors found that the regimes are not fixed throughout time, changing from
a non-Ricardian regime, from the 1960s throughout the 1980s, to a Ricardian regime af-
terwards. Sala (2004) made an analysis, also for the USA, and for the same period as
Favero and Monacelli (2003) and by performing a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis
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observed that between 1960 and 1979 there is evidence of a non-Ricardian regime and
that from 1990 onwards there seems to exist a Ricardian regime. Moreover, Sala (2004)
stated that between 1982 and 1990 there is no fiscal regime defined. During this period,
the central bank was implementing measures to reduce inflation, but the government was
not responding to those policies.
Afonso (2008) tested whether regimes in the EU-fifteen countries are Ricardian or
non-Ricardian by using panel data, for the period between 1970 and 2003. The results
showed that, during that period, there is evidence of the presence of Ricardian fiscal
regimes, since the budget balance reacts to the debt level. The author also found evi-
dence that the higher the indebtedness of the country, the higher the fiscal policy effort to
deliver a surplus. To study the fiscal policy behaviour in Japan, the USA and the United
Kingdom (UK), Ito et al. (2011) estimated a Markov-switching model by the Bayesian
method, spanning more than a century for all the countries. The authors observed that,
while in Japan there is a stochastic switch between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes,
for the USA and the UK there is evidence that the fiscal policy presented a Ricardian
Regime.
Concerning the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, Semmler and Zhang
(2004) performed a State-Space model with Markov-switching for France and Germany
and found that, for those countries, the interactions between the two policies were not
strong, contrariwise they were countercyclical for the period under analysis. Cevik et al.
(2014) achieved similar results, when performing a joint transition matrix for the two
policies, for some emerging European economies, between 1995 and 2010.
Davig and Leeper (2011) performed Markov-switching monetary and fiscal policy
rules, for the USA, concluding that the regimes fluctuate throughout time, between active
and passive, but that the periods with a passive monetary policy tend to last more. Also
for the USA, Bianchi and Ilut (2017) performed a Markov-switching Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to understand the policy mix, concluding that the
fiscal regimes change from passive to active throughout time. Moreover, the authors
found that when fiscal policy is active, a fiscal imbalance leads to a lasting increase in the
price level, while the monetary authority has no power over inflation. Hence, the decision
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making of the central bank is only going to be effective, and have influence over the price
level, when the fiscal authority takes those decisions in consideration.
To assess the policies interactions, Afonso et al. (2019) used a monetary authority
function with fiscal variables and a fiscal authority function with monetary variables. The
authors used a panel data set, with a time span from 1970 to 2015, of the twenty-eight EU
countries. The authors concluded that central banks do not react to fiscal policy, acting
passively, and that the primary balance reacts positively to government debt, however with
a lower impact than the one that exists when considering the fiscal individual reaction
functions.
Regarding the effect that de Great Recession had over monetary and fiscal policies,
Mitreska et al. (2010) concluded that with the financial crisis there were a lot of tools
that were implemented by central banks and governments and that the policy mix might
have been affected by those stimuli. The authors find that this change is stronger in de-
veloped countries, in which the fiscal policy had a larger impact during the crisis. Alcidi
and Thirion (2016) studied the policy mix for the euro area, the USA and the UK, in the
periods before and after the financial crisis. Their main conclusions were that from 2000
to 2015, the interaction between the polices appeared to be different in the euro area rel-
ative to the USA. For instance, because of unconventional monetary policy measures, the
inverse relationship between interest rates and inflation is not so relevant in the after-crisis
period since the interest rate stopped being a good proxy for monetary policy. Concern-
ing the fiscal policy, the euro area had a more conservative procedure because of fiscal
rules, the shock of sovereign crisis and the fiscal cost that most governments had after the
support given to financial institutions.
Silva and Vieira (2017) used panel data for advanced and developing economies and
performed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model for two periods: before the
financial crisis (from 2001 to 2008) and after (from 2009 to 2012). For the monetary
policy reaction function, the authors concluded that when there is a change in inflation,
the central bank policy is going to have the same sign, and that this relation did not
change with the financial crisis. However, for most advanced economies, this policy is not
pursued through a change in the nominal interest rate, because of the zero lower bound,
8
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but through unconventional monetary instruments. For the fiscal policy reaction function,
Silva and Vieira (2017) concluded that prior to the crisis, the higher the budget balance
in one period, the lower the government expenditure in the following period. However,
this relation ceased to exist after the financial crisis, in the case of advanced economies,
where the use of fiscal policy gained a major role as a macroeconomic policy tool.
3 DATA AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
The analysis being performed gathers annual data from 1995 to 2019, for the 28 coun-
tries that belong to the European Union. We can split these countries into two groups, the
ones that belong to the euro area - Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain,- and the ones that did not adopt the common currency
- Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
The data used in this study was extracted from the European Commission AMECO
database. The dataset includes the following variables:
• the cyclically adjusted primary balance (capb);
• the debt ratio (debt);
• the short-term nominal interest rate (i);
• the long-term nominal interest rate (il);
• the real effective exchange rate (reer);
• and the inflation rate (π), measured as the instantaneous growth rate of the Harmo-
nized Consumer Price Index (HCPI).
The description of the data being used is presented in Table VI in the Appendices.
Moreover, to assess the impact of the financial crisis over the conduction of monetary
and fiscal policies, and the interaction between them, a dummy variable for the after-crisis
period (from 2009 to 2019) was created.
9
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In Table I it is possible to observe the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this
survey.
TABLE I: Descriptive Statistics for the full sample: 1995-2019.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
capb 700 0.064 3.240 -29.233 9.565
debt 693 56.656 33.440 3.766 181.212
i 663 4.037 7.305 -0.500 80.750
il 614 4.367 2.654 -0.250 22.500
reer 700 98.672 15.480 29.986 170.322
inf 676 1.327 2.332 -0.741 40.643
The analysis being performed uses a panel data approach, having both a cross-sectional
and a time series dimension. Since data is not available for every country, at every period,
we are dealing with unbalanced panel data.
The methodologies being applied are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the Two-
stage Least Square (2SLS) and the GMM models. Using OLS with panel data may lead
to heterogeneity bias, if the unique errors are correlated with the independent variables.
Therefore, we also resort to 2SLS, which allows us to deal with endogeneity, the problem
of omitted variables bias, and hence unobserved heterogeneity, by using instrumental
variables. Two conditions must be satisfied, so that we have a relevant instrument: it must
not have partial effects over the dependent variable and needs to be uncorrelated with the
omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2016). In this work, one-period lag independent variables
are used as instruments. In order to decide between fixed and random effects, we run a
Hausman (1978) test. This allows us to test whether the unique errors are correlated with
the regressors, being the null hypothesis that they are not. Hence, if we reject the null
hypothesis, we use fixed effects.
Moreover, we also estimated a two-step system GMM. Besides taking into considera-
tion the time series dimension of the data, this method also treats the explanatory variables
as being endogenous and deals with non-observable effects (Verbeek, 2014). In order to
test the validation of the instruments being used, we resort to the Hansen (1982) statistic.
We also test for the presence of second order autocorrelation of the error term, by look-
ing at the AR(2). Because of the mentioned characteristics, we give priority to the GMM
10
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method for the EU and to the 2SLS1 method when considering the euro area and non-euro
area sub-groups.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis of this study is divided into 4 different parts. Firstly, we es-
timate, separately, the individual regressions for monetary policy and for fiscal policy.
Afterwards, in order to observe the interactions between the two policies, we estimate the
same regressions as for the individual authorities, but with a difference: while the mone-
tary policy reaction function includes a fiscal variable, the fiscal policy reaction function
will feature monetary variables.
4.1 Monetary Policy
Most of the existent literature on the analysis of monetary policy follows the Taylor
rule, where the interest rate is the monetary instrument. This work is going to follow
the same path, and more specifically, will apply the equation defined by Silva and Vieira
(2017) affixing the dummy for the after-crisis period. Although unconventional monetary
policy was used as tool during the financial crisis, we will focus our analysis in the con-
ventional monetary instruments. Hence, the monetary policy regression is given by the
following expression:
ij,t = β0j,t + β1j,tij,t−1 + β2j,tπj,t + β3j,treerj,t + β4j,taftcrij,t + µj,t (2)
where the index j (j = 1, 2, . . . , J) represents the country, the index t (t = 1, 0, dots, T )
denotes the period, i is the short-term nominal interest rate, π is the inflation rate, reer is
the real effective exchange rate and aftcri a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when
t is between 2009 and 2019 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, β0j,t stands for the estimated
individual effects for each country j and µj,t are the independent disturbances across
countries.
In Table II the estimated results for regression (2) are presented. Regarding the EU,
all the variables, besides the real effective exchange rate, are statistically significant at a
1The GMM is not useful when considering the sub-groups, since the instruments largely outnumber the
number of groups.
11























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ALEXANDRE SOUSA INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
1% level. Both the one-period lagged nominal interest rate and the inflation rate have a
positive impact over the nominal interest rate however with different magnitudes. While
an increase of 1% in the lagged interest rate leads to a rise of 0.595% in the interest rate,
rising the inflation rate by 1% soars the dependent variable by 1.066%. When looking at
the after-crisis period, the interest rates are, on average, 0.924% lower than in the period
between 1995 and 2008. This outcome was predictable since most countries have been
dealing with low inflation rates, leading to central banks responding with low interest
rates.
Comparing the results for the euro area and the non-euro area countries, it is possible
to observe that the real effective exchange rate is still the only variable that it is not sta-
tistically significant. Regarding the one-period lagged nominal interest rate, the effect on
both zones is similar. However, when looking at the inflation rate, there seems to exist
evidence that when it changes, it has a higher impact on the interest rates of non-euro area
countries than in euro area ones. Concerning the after-crisis period, the coefficients are
negative, and higher for the countries that use the euro, suggesting that the ECB lowered
the interest rates more aggressively than the other national central banks. In fact, while in
the euro countries the nominal interest rates decreased, on average, 1.266% in the post-
crisis, in the other EU countries they only decreased by 1.017%, on average. Notably, the
R2 lowers when analysing only the euro area countries, suggesting that the interest rate in
that area was more affected by variables that are not captured in the model.
Our results regarding the conduction of monetary policy are coherent with those found
by Wolters (2012) and Silva and Vieira (2017).
4.2 Fiscal Policy
Regarding the conduction of fiscal policy, the dependent variable is normally the pri-
mary budget balance. It looks logical that, if countries want to reduce their public debt
stock, there is the need to deliver, at least, primary surpluses. In this study, the fiscal
policy reaction function suggested by (Afonso, 2008) is followed and adapted as follows:
capbj,t = β0j,t + β1j,tcapbj,t−1 + β2j,tdebtj,t−1 + β3j,taftcrij,t + µj,t (3)
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where the index j (j = 1, 2, . . . , J) represents the country, the index t (t = 1, 0, . . . , T )
denotes the period, capb is the cyclically adjusted primary balance, debt is the percentage
given by the ratio of government debt over potential output and aftcri a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 when t is between 2009 and 2019 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, β0j,t
stands for the individual effects for each country j and µj,t are the independent distur-
bances across countries.
Besides analysing the effect of the level of public debt over the cyclically adjusted
primary balance, we also want to assess how a variation of the public debt affects that
same dependent variable. That said, we use Equation (3), substituting the debt level by
the variation of the public debt. The new equation is given by:
capbj,t = β0j,t + β1j,tcapbj,t−1 + β2j,t∆debtj,t−1 + β3j,taftcrij,t + µj,t. (4)
The results from the estimation of regression (3) are presented in Table III and of
Equation (4) are on Table VII in the Appendices. Firstly, starting with the results for
Equation (3) and looking at the EU, we can observe that all variables are statistically
significant at a 1% level. The cyclically adjusted primary balance seems to be positively
impacted by its one-period lag, rising by 0.666% when the lagged one increases by 1%.
Regarding the one-period lagged debt level, we can state that when it rises by 1%, the
cyclically adjusted primary balance increases by 0.0016%. Since a rise in the debt level
leads to an increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, we can assume that the
EU, as a whole, follows a Ricardian fiscal regime, maintaining a stable financial situation.
According to the results, the years after the Great Recession had a negative impact over
the cyclically adjusted primary balance, lowering it by 0.966% on average.
Now looking at the Equation (4), it is possible to observe that the variation of public
debt is the only statistically significant at a 1% level2. If we compare the results above
stated, for regression (3), with the ones estimated for this specification we can state that
the Great Recession seems to have no effect this time. However, governments react to
both the cyclically adjusted primary balance from the previous year and the variation of
the debt level. In fact, a positive variation of public debt of 1% leads to a decrease of
2In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high
to be considered accurate (Roodman, 2009).
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0.467% on the cyclically adjusted primary balance.
Regarding regression (3) and observing the two sub-groups, the euro area and the non-
euro area countries, all variables continue to be statistically significant at a 1% level, with
some differences arising between the two areas. There seems to exist evidence that the
cyclically adjusted primary balance is positively affected by its lag with a higher impact
in the euro area than in the non-euro area countries. Concerning the lagged debt level, its
coefficient is slightly higher in the euro area: when it rises by 1%, it leads to an increase of
0.068% in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, comparing with an increase of 0.047%
for the non-euro area countries.
Concerning the post-crisis period, it is clear that its negative impact was substantially
higher in the countries that adopted the euro. In fact, that decrease in euro area countries
was on average of 1.870%, almost double than in countries that did not adopt the euro,
that suffered a decrease of 0.941%, on average. This information fits together with the
countries that had sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Portugal, Ireland and Greece) that were
mostly members of the euro area.
Looking again at Equation (4), it is possible to observe that, for both euro and non-
euro countries, the only variable that is statistically significant at a 5% level is the variation
of public debt. Comparing these estimations with those of regression (3) we can state
right ahead that the financial crisis had no impact over the relations presented in this
regression, for both sub-groups. Governments of both sub-groups seem to only respond to
the variation of the debt level, however with a higher magnitude in the euro area countries
than in the non-euro area ones. In fact, while for the euro countries a positive variation
of the public debt of 1% leads to a decrease of 0.525% on the cyclically adjusted primary
balance, for non-euro countries, the reduction is only of 0.492%.
The results for fiscal regimes are consistent with the ones reported by Afonso (2008),
Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009) and Afonso and Jalles (2017).
4.3 Monetary Policy Reaction Function
In order to observe if there is some evidence that the central bank’s decision making
takes into consideration the behaviour of the government, Equation (2) is again computed,
16
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but with a little twist: the addiction of the cyclically adjusted primary balance with one-
period lag. The new equation is the following:
ij,t = β0j,t +β1j,tij,t−1 +β2j,tπj,t +β3j,treerj,t +β4j,taftcrij,t +β5j,tcapbj,t−1 +µj,t. (5)
In Table IV the estimated results for regression (5) are presented. Regarding the EU,
all the variables, besides the real effective exchange rate and the one-period lagged cycli-
cally adjusted primary balance, are statistically significant at a 1% level. The first aspect
that stands out is that central banks are not reacting to fiscal policy, since the cyclically
adjusted primary balance is not statistically significant. Hence, there is evidence that the
monetary authorities are following an active policy regime, not taking the fiscal policy
results into its decision making.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the results are similar to the ones found
when estimating Equation (2). The one-period lagged nominal interest rate and the in-
flation rate have a positive impact over the nominal interest rate, and when each one
increases by 1%, the dependent variable rises by 0.595% and 1.064%, respectively. Con-
cerning the after-crisis period, it seems to have a bigger impact on the monetary policy
reaction function than in the estimation of Equation (2). The interest rates are, on average,
0.940% lower than in the period before the financial crisis.
Looking at the euro area and the non-euro area countries, it is possible to observe
that the real effective exchange rate and the cyclically adjusted primary balance are still
the only variables that are not statistically significant. Therefore, we make the same con-
clusion as for the EU: the central banks do not take into consideration the government’s
action. An increase of 1% in the one-period lagged nominal interest rate increases the
nominal interest rate by 0.0532% in the euro area and by 0.552% in countries that did not
adopt the euro. When looking at the inflation rate, as in Equation (2), it has a higher im-
pact on the dependent variable if we consider non-euro area countries. When it increases
by 1%, the nominal interest rate rises by 1.257% in those countries and only by 0.981% in
the euro area. Regarding the 2009-2019 period, we conclude the same as for the EU: the
coefficients are higher in this situation, when compared to the monetary authority alone.
While in the euro area the interest rates dropped, on average, 1.401% in the post-crisis, in
the non-euro area countries they only decreased by 1.136%, on average.
17
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4.4 Fiscal Policy Reaction Function
To assess whether monetary policy has some influence over the conduction of fiscal
policy, we take into consideration Equations (3) and (4) and change them, by adding the
lagged short-term nominal interest rate and the lagged long-term nominal interest rate
(il). We include the latter one, in order to try to capture forward guidance developed by
central banks. Then, the new regressions are given by:
capbj,t = β0j,t + β1j,tcapbj,t−1 + β2j,tdebtj,t−1 + β3j,taftcrij,t+
+β4j,tij,t−1 + β5j,tilj,t−1µj,t
(6)
capbj,t = β0j,t + β1j,tcapbj,t−1 + β2j,t∆debtj,t−1 + β3j,taftcrij,t+
+β4j,tij,t−1 + β5j,tilj,t−1µj,t.
(7)
The results from the estimation of regression (6) are presented in Table V and those
of Equation (7) are in Table VIII in the Appendices. Firstly, considering regression (6)
looking at the EU, we can observe that, when dealing with endogeneity, all variables are
statistically significant at a 1% level, 3, besides the long-term nominal interest rate. This
may indicate that the forward guidance developed by central banks does not influence
governments’ decision making. Contrarily, one aspect that stands out is that fiscal pol-
icy is affected by the monetary authorities’ decision making, at least for the short-term
nominal interest rates. In fact, an increase of 1% in that independent variable leads to a
decrease of 0.66% on the cyclically adjusted primary balance. This suggests a relationship
of substitutability between the monetary and fiscal policies.
With respect to the lagged cyclically adjusted primary balance and the lagged debt
level, the results are similar to those estimated in Equation (3). When these variables
increase by 1%, the interest rate rises by 0.629% and 0.059%, respectively. As determined
when estimating Equation (3), the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts positively to
the debt level, allowing us to assume that in the EU a Ricardian fiscal regime is followed.
Notably, in the after-crisis period, the effect over the dependent variable is much higher
for the fiscal policy reaction function than the one estimated for the fiscal policy alone.
3In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high
to be considered accurate (Roodman, 2009).
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In this situation the Great Recession lowered the cyclically adjusted primary balance by
2.450%, on average.
Now considering Equation (7), it is possible to observe that for the Euro area all
variables are statistically significant at a 1% level,4 besides the dummy for the after crisis
period and the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Juxtaposing these estimations with
those found for the specification (6), the differences that stand out are that, in this case,
the period after the financial crisis seems to have no impact over the dependent variables,
while the long-term nominal interest has. In fact, there is evidence that an increase of
1% in the long-term nominal interest rate leads the cyclically adjusted primary balance to
soar by 0.442%. Regarding the variation in public debt, when it increases by 1%, it leads
to a decrease of 0.512% in the cyclically adjusted primary balance.
Looking at the two sub-groups, euro area and non-euro area countries, all variables,
besides the long-term nominal interest rate and the lagged debt level of the non-euro area
countries, continue to be statistically significant at a 1% level. For the countries that did
not adopt the euro, the lagged debt level is only statistically significant at a 10% level.
There is evidence that the cyclically adjusted primary balance is positively affected by its
lag. However, considering the government’s reaction function, the impact is higher in the
non-euro area countries than in the euro area, while when performing the analysis solely
for the fiscal policy, the results were the opposite. Regarding the lagged debt level, its co-
efficient is slightly higher in the euro area, leading to an increase in the cyclically adjusted
primary balance of 0.052% when rising 1%, comparing with an increase of 0.013% for
the non-euro area countries.
For the post-crisis period, it is clear that the crisis’ negative impact was significantly
higher in the countries that adopted the euro. The decrease of the cyclically adjusted
primary balance, in the euro area countries was on average of 2.721%, more than double
than that in the countries that did not adopt the euro, where it suffered a decrease of
1.256%, on average. Regarding the one-period lagged short-term nominal interest rate, it
has a negative coefficient on both areas, indicating a substitution effect between the two
4In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high
to be considered accurate (Roodman, 2009).
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policies. However, there is evidence that the governments of countries that did not adopt
the euro are more affected by changes in the lagged short-term nominal interest rate.
In fact, a change of 1% on that variable leads to a variation, on the cyclically adjusted
primary balance, of -0.357% in the euro area and -.583% in the non-euro area countries.
Observing again Equation (7), we can state that for the euro area all variables are sta-
tistically significant at a 1% level, besides the dummy for the after crisis period and the
cyclically adjusted primary balance, while for non-euro area countries only the variation
of the debt level is not statistically significant at a 5% level. Comparing the results pre-
sented above with the ones estimated for this regression, it is curious to observe that on
the one hand, the lagged cyclically adjusted primary seems to have no influence over the
dependent variable in the euro area and have for the other countries, while on the other
hand the opposite happens with the variation of public debt. Another aspect that stands
out is that the period after the Great Recession only as an impact on the countries that do
not belong to the euro area. As for the EU, the long-term nominal interest rate impacts the
dependent variables in both sub-groups, however with a higher magnitude for non-euro
area countries. In fact, an increase of 1% in the long-term nominal interest rate leads to
a soar of 0.539% in the cyclically adjusted primary balance in non-euro countries and of
only 0.421% for the euro area ones.
In sum, the results that we find for the estimation of the reaction function of monetary
policy to fiscal variables, and the other way around, are in line with the studies done by
Alcidi and Thirion (2016), Silva and Vieira (2017), and Afonso et al. (2019).
5 CONCLUSION
During the last years, the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies gained
renewed importance due to the Great Recession. In the EU, this discussion acquires
even more importance, since the countries that belong to the euro area have centralized
monetary policy, but the government of each country is responsible for the fiscal policy.
The adoption of extraordinary policies, from both monetary and fiscal authorities, may
have led to a change on the policy mix. On the monetary policy side, the zero lower bound
and the implementation of unconventional monetary policy, and for the fiscal policy the
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especial packages implemented, led to a combination of measures that had never been
seen before.
By using panel data, our objective was to understand how each policy behaved in the
European Union, between 1995 and 2019, and how their interactions might have been
affected. Furthermore, we did the same analysis for two sub-regions, the euro area and
the non-euro area countries, in order to assess if there are any differences between the
countries that adopted the euro and the ones that did not.
Regarding the conduction of monetary policy, we find that the inflation rate has a
big impact over the central banks’ decision making and that this effect is higher in those
countries that do not belong to the euro area. Having inflation has a crucial variable for
the determination of interest rates was expected, since most central banks define price
stability as their mandate. Another aspect, that is not surprising, is that in the post-crisis
period the interest rates declined, with a higher impact on the euro area. The real effective
exchange rate seems to have no effect over the interest rate.
Concerning fiscal policy, the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts positively to
increases in the level of government debt. This idea reveals a Ricardian fiscal regime,
disclosing that fiscal authorities are concerned with the health of public finances. Fur-
thermore, after the Great Recession the cyclically adjusted primary balance severely de-
creased and, when comparing the two sub-regions, the euro area was more affected. This
last effect was expected, since it reflects the sovereign crisis that some countries went
through. We also found evidence that there is a negative relation between the variation
of the cyclically adjusted primary balance and the variable that represents the variation of
the public debt that occurred in the previous year.
We also estimated the reaction functions for monetary policy, considering a fiscal
variable, and for fiscal policy, considering monetary attributes. Our estimation showed
that central banks do not take into consideration the cyclically adjusted primary balance,
hence presenting an active behaviour. On the other hand, governments seem to be affected
by the short-term interest rate in a negative way. This hints that the relation between those
policies is of substitution. Moreover, there is evidence that this substitutability is of a
higher degree for the countries that do not use the euro.
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Summing up, the conception that monetary policy independently controls the stability
of the price level, while governments try to keep a good health for the public finances
ends up being confirmed. Nevertheless, the monetary authority presents an active role,
taking action when the cyclically adjusted primary balance gets out of hand. Going along
with the existing literature, this suggests a relation of substitutability between monetary
and fiscal policies. Moreover, the euro area states were more affected by the 2007-2009
financial crisis than the other countries of the EU.
This kind of analysis gives new insights on the conduction of monetary and fiscal
policy, and their interaction. Hence, it allows both monetary and fiscal authorities to
understand what to expect from their decisions, while being able to predict how they may
affect the other policy maker.
As the conduction of monetary and fiscal policies, as well as their interactions, is
volatile, it is necessary to closely monitor their developments. For instance, the economic
crisis triggered by the COVID-19 outbreak, led to the implementation of especial liquid-
ity providing measures by central banks and stimulus packages by the EU and national
governments, increasing public expenditure unexpectedly. When new data becomes avail-
able, an estimation of the new panorama would be very interesting.
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TABLE VI: Data Description and Transformations
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